

demotrends

quadrimestrale sulla realtà demografica italiana

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A Sea Between Peoples and Cultures

There are two ways of looking at the Mediterranean basin. The ruins of the Phoenician, Greek and Roman cities, the Alhambra in Granada, and the Palatine Chapel of Palermo are the magnificent remains of a circulation of peoples and cultures which have made the Mediterranean basin the first true *melting pot* in human history. The naval battles of Milazzo, Issa and Lepanto mark bloody episodes in the history of clashes between those peoples and cultures, clashes that draw a *fault line* between the western and eastern basin, between the northern and southern shores.

Due to the indissoluble cohabitation of these two approaches, these two views are not mutually exclusive. At the present time, the *fault line* viewpoint corresponds perfectly to the contrasts on the demographic, economic and political level as well as between some of the values underlying society. The *melting pot* is the only feasible solution if we want to reconcile opposing views and interests.

There is a net contrast between the Northwest and the Southeast with regard to economic wellbeing. The average disposable income per person in France or Italy is more than six times that in Morocco, Egypt, Syria or Jordan. But poverty and the structural backwardness of the economy are strictly connected with population through the labour force. The Mediterranean basin represents a highly heterogeneous area in which the various countries are characterised by the different stages reached throughout the long road of demographic transition. The countries on the northern shore are in the most advanced stage (life expectancy at birth longer than 78 years and fertility rates less than the cohort replacement rate), so



that their population is ageing and will soon decline. The countries on the southern and eastern shores are still behind, though at different stages (often life expectancy at birth shorter than 70 years; total fertility rate between 2.5 and 3.5). Their population-growth rates, though falling, are still around 1.5-2.5 per cent a year. Nevertheless, the countries in the less developed areas are now experiencing a period of favourable demographic trends: on the one hand, their labour force is growing fast and very young and, on the other, they can exploit a female labour force which is still under-utilised.

The real challenge facing all of us, the peoples of the southern, eastern and northern shores of the Mediterranean basin, is to transform those potentials into real development. In fact, the future of the countries facing us in the Mediterranean basin cannot develop completely within their boundaries: it is just as likely that outflows of temporary or permanent migra-

tion will continue due to population pressure and the economic and social changes required in those countries. But those flows are directed to the European countries also because of some quantitative and qualitative needs emerging on our own labour markets.

It should not be expected that the imbalances and tensions in across the Mediterranean can be solved by these flows, as if by magic. Our needs will be too small in the face of the tumultuous growth of the labour force due to take place on the southern and eastern shores, and it seems that the non-economic factors inducing a large part of the migration flows crossing the sea daily are likely to remain.

The gap will probably increase since the countries of the northern shore are partners in a new world-wide economic empire, while those to the south and east constantly risk being pushed backwards and isolate by internal religious and ideological fanaticism and by the international seesaw of raw-material prices, especially oil, on which most of their economies depend.

In any case, the only valid solution is to overcome contrasts with the will for cohesion, i.e. from the *melting pot* viewpoint. If besides utilising their labour force, we are able to appreciate the values of the culture and civilisation brought by immigrant populations, so that these exist side by side with our own; if the European Union does not close up its *fortress* or be perceived on the other shores as a new *Satan* to be exorcised and fought; if conditions of reliability and security are established in southern, eastern and Balkan countries, thereby allowing for major productive and tourist investment; if all this happens, the true vocation of the sea might prevail in the Mediterranean basin (in Latin, besides *pelagus*, sea is also *pontus*, from the Greek Πόντος); that of being a bridge (in Latin *pons*, *pontis*) between the peoples who live on its shores.

Giuseppe Gesano

Population Trends in the Mediterranean Area

After the Second World War, it was common opinion that the destiny of the Southern European countries was a relatively straightforward one. In the context of the old continent, they would specialize in the agricultural sector while manufacturing would remain a secondary outlet, subsidiary to the strong Western economies of ancient industrialization. Their demography – characterized by large pockets of very high birth rates and high infant mortality – would remain buoyant and provide the needed manpower to the demographically weaker industrial nations. Emigration would be a major outlet and an important source of revenue sustaining internal consumption and investment. But soon enough Italy, closely followed by Spain, Greece and Portugal, demonstrated that the course of events was taking another direction and that the Mediterranean cultures were not excluded from patterns of development once thought to be exclusive of Western Europe.

When thinking of the future of the Mediterranean world, I am reminded of the frailty of our paradigms. Population implosion seems imminent in the Iberian, Italian and Greek peninsulas, fortresses protecting wealthy Europe from the pressure of the populations of the South and East Mediter-

anean, whose ramparts are besieged, everyday of the year, by thousands of potential immigrants. Fertility below replacement appears to have become a structural feature, deriving from deeply imbedded behaviour, unresponsive to policies and unlikely to change. Immigration is suffered as an inevitable price to be paid in order to remain economically alive and competitive. On the other hand, we can look to the South and East of besieged Europe, where population is growing fast and their labor force even faster; fertility is still high by European standards; economies are growing at an uncertain pace and the gaps with Europe are, in many cases, widening instead of narrowing. All the conditions for a continuing or increasing demographic pressure on Europe seem verified.

However, a different future can also be envisaged. There is no assurance that the perceived demographic implosion of the peninsulas cannot be reversed. Low fertility is a consequence of the interplay of costs and benefits, and public action and social agents may redirect material resources and reshape social rules in such a way as to compress the direct or indirect relative costs of childbearing and childrearing. A sustained effort in this direction may have positive effects on fertility. On the other hand, in the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean shores, fertility is falling faster than anticipated. Total fertility in Turkey is now the same as Italy's in the 50s and 60s, and in Tunisia it is the same as Spain's in the 70s. Nobody can rule out the possibility that, a few decades from now, below replacement fertility might not have set in. Migratory pressures may not remain as strong as

they are now. Propensity to migrate is also a consequence of the costs-benefits balance and it may decline even if per-capita income or wage differentials remain constant or increase. This happens because the social and psychological costs of moving increase faster than per-capita income and once a certain level is attained, propensity to migrate may wane altogether. Italian and Iberian migrants ceased to migrate northward when per-capita income in the regions of destination was still a multiple of that in the countries of origin. So, it may well be that a likely scenario two or three decades from now could be quite different from the one we perceive on the basis of the current situation.

There is no doubt, however, that migration will be the main issue in the Mediterranean basin. Policies are still uncertain at the European Union level and seem to be limited to the efforts of controlling illegal immigration, in spite of the fact that an opening up of frontiers is inevitable. Each country has its own agenda and its own priorities and the EU has 15 different migration policies instead of one, as one is (or should be) the labor market. Migration policies should also be active ones, and this implies two sets of actions. The first is deciding how many immigrants are needed, from where and with what kind of characteristics – a difficult policy that needs a lot of empirical knowledge and multi-layered decisions. The second one concerns ensuring the positive insertion of immigrants in society and the opening up of a path that may eventually lead to the full concession of political rights and citizenship.

Massimo Livi Bacci
Chairman of the IRP Advisory Board

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Women in Southern Mediterranean Countries

The relevance of women issues to economic development

In a book published in the early 1990s on human resources of the Mediterranean area, Massimo Livi Bacci identified the rapid accumulation of wealth and fast population growth as the phenomena typically polarising the development forces in the Mediterranean area, producing a division between the countries of the northern shores and those of the southern shores. In the 1990s, two international conferences (the 1993 Cairo Conference and the 1995 Peking Conference) pointed out how, in the relationship between population and development, the status of women plays a primary role. As a matter of fact, according to Vallin, "reflecting on development leads us to ask about the role of women and how this role leads us to look into women's status".

Women's status, in fact, provides information on the stage of demographic transition at which a country finds itself, which represents an important indicator of women's capacity of access to educational, health and social-security resources, and therefore the country's capacity for the non-coercive control of its fertility rates. Nevertheless, the comparison must take into account of fact that in countries with developing economies and an Islamic religion and culture, there are not only considerable differences between men and women (we need only recall access to education and wage differences) but also between women, for example with regard to the use of modern forms of contraception or the weight of family duties. Together with the differences between women belonging to different generations, there are also geographical ones between living conditions in urban and in rural areas.

Formally speaking, the national constitutions of many countries of the southern shores of the Mediterranean recognise equality between men and women. For example, Art. 38 of the Algerian constitution declares the equality of men and women before the law, condemning any form of gender-based discrimination, while Art. 30 refers to the equality of rights and duties of all citizens, whether male or female. Art. 11 of the Egyptian constitution likewise guarantees equal opportunity to women, nevertheless recognising limitations (duties towards the family), and subordinating equal opportunity to the rules of Islamic law. It should be pointed out in this regard that while Egypt (with Cyprus, Turkey, Libya and Tunisia) has ratified and accepted the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women adopted by the United Nations in December 1978, Algeria and Morocco have neither signed nor ratified the Convention.

We should thus consider some indicators that may provide us with a picture of the status of women in these countries. We shall start with the possibility for women to plan the birth of their own children.

National legislation on abortion differs little between the various countries, since it is almost totally forbidden in all of them. It is currently allowed only in Tunisia and Turkey, while in the others -



ited - abortion is allowed in exceptional cases, e.g. when the woman's life is in danger (Algeria and Egypt) or in case of rape or incest (Algeria). On the other hand, maternity leave guaranteed to working mothers varies widely, ranging from 30 days in Tunisia to 14 weeks in Algeria. The percentage of wages in the period covered likewise varies from 100% in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia to 50% in Jordan and Libya where it is paid by the employer and not by social security.

Gender-based disparities in access to education, as well as differences between women themselves, have important demographic effects because fertility and child mortality rates are closely related to female educational levels. Youssef Courbage showed that the sharp fall in the birth rate exhibited by all the Islamic countries of Mediterranean Africa and the Middle East (with exceptions related to specific national conditions) during the 1990s can be explained by higher educational levels for girls and an improvement in health and sanitary conditions. Thus the percentages of illiterate women between the first ten cohorts in reproductive age (15-24 years

take into account family help in the agricultural sector and in domestic jobs employing above all married women (due to the impediments against doing non-domestic work and their task of raising children). Algerian women who have a job outside the home are mainly unmarried and live in an urban area.

Finally, although women represent about half the population of these countries, they have very little political influence. With the exclusion of the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia, on the one hand, and Israel and Cyprus, on the other, in the rest of the countries in question the percentage of seats in parliament occupied by women varies from 0.7% in Morocco to 2.5% in Jordan. By contrast, Greece, France and Italy - the EU countries with the lowest percentage of women elected in national parliaments - have 6.3%, 9.1% and 10%, respectively.

Attempts to describe women's status in the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean, on the basis of indicators more suited to measuring the gap between the status of men and women in Western countries, could show an obvious

result - the condition of women in Islamic countries is worse than that of women in Western democracies -; this view could also be accused of being ethnically-centred. Both objections are well-grounded; nevertheless, two aspects could be cited. Firstly, as increasing amounts of literature on this topic shows, women's status, population changes and the prosperity are closely inter-related, representing an important condition for development. This latter, in fact, is primarily guaranteed by the removal of serious obstacles hindering women's access to education, the labour market and political and administrative power. Secondly, women are generally the first group who suffer a worsening of their status and are subjected to rigid rules of behaviour, prohibitions and violence when fundamentalist or neo-traditionalist movements become powerful in a society.

With regard to data on female participation in the labour market, the low activity rate generally shown for these countries in international statistics contrasts sharply with the workloads and many roles characterising a woman's day. This contrast is largely explained by the greater presence of women in the informal economy and their low percentage in salaried employment. In Algeria, 24% of the female population aged over 15 is economically active, but this percentage fails to

Socioeconomic indicators on woman condition by year and country

Country	/Year	Abortion permitted	No. of weeks of maternity leave ^(b)	% 15-24 illiterate	% 25+ illiterate	Economic activity rate (age 15+) (%)	Women's share of the adult labour force (%)	Seats in parliament head by women (as % of total) ^(f)
		1994 ^(a)	Early 1990s	Last available	Last available	1995	1995	1996
Morocco		No	12	69.0	89.9	40	34	0.7
Algeria		No	14	37.8	79.5	24	24	3.8
Tunisia		Yes	30 days	27.8	67.7	35	30	7.4
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		No	50 days	19.7	83.2	23	21	...
Egypt		No	50 days	46.0 ^(d)	78.1 ^(d)	33	29	2.0
Jordan		No	6 ^(c)	3.5	40.6	22	21	2.5
Israel		No	...	1.2	9.3	46	41	7.5
Lebanon		No	40 days	27	28	2.3
Syrian Arab Rep.		No	50 days	41.0 ^(e)	76.3 ^(e)	26	25	10.4
Cyprus		No	...	0.4	12.5	49	38	5.4
Turkey		Yes	...	11.6	40.3	47	36	2.4

- (a) Abortion is considered as permitted only if it is allowed on grounds of economic or social reasons or on request.
 (b) No. of weeks or days (when indicated)
 (c) 3 weeks before delivery + 3 after delivery
 (d) Data refer to Egyptian nationals only and exclude unemployed population.
 (e) National population only.
 (f) Data are as of 5 February 1999.

Source: UNDP, UNESCO.

Dante Sabatino

People on the Move

Main trends in the migration systems of the European and oil-producing Arab countries

There are two well-defined, highly differentiated migration systems in the Mediterranean area, the European one and the one formed by the oil-producing Arab countries. The core of the former is represented by the 15 countries of the European Union, where, the links and the restraints in migration field are increasingly strengthened and pressing due to the process of economic and political integration. The migration system of the oil-producing Arab countries, on the other hand, is centred on the states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar). These countries share a migration policy based on the promotion of temporary labour migration, the reluctance to grant permanent settlement and the fact that it is virtually impossible to obtain citizenship.

The data of the Population Division of the United Nations on the migrant stock give an overall idea of the size of migration, despite the inevitable discrepancies regarding comparability and the fact that they date back to the now distant year 1990. In that year, the total number of immigrants in the countries of North Africa and of the Middle East exceeded 16 million, or 6% of the total population. This was the same percentage as in Western Europe, where the overall figure was nearly 22.7 million. In the 1980s, there was an increase in migration in both absolute and relative terms in nearly all the countries considered. In Europe, the country with the highest number of immigrants was France (5.9 million), followed by Germany (5 million) and the UK (3.7 million); the highest percentage rates with respect to the total population were recorded in Luxembourg (31.5%), Switzerland (16%) and France (10.4%). Migration also proved to be extensive on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean and in the Near East. In this geographical area, the country with the largest migrant stock was Saudi Arabia with 4 million, followed by Kuwait and the Arab Emirates (1.5 million), Israel (1.4 million), Turkey and Jordan (1.1 million). In relative terms, the percentage weight of immigration was greater than in Europe, also because in general the population of these countries is lower. The rate ranged from a maximum in the Arab Emi-

rates, where 9 residents out of 10 were foreigners, 72% in Kuwait, 63.5% in Qatar, rates over 30% in Bahrain, Oman and Israel, to 25-26% in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Refugee flows, labour migration and population moves have helped contribute to this situation involving a quota of immigrants similar to that in Europe, and on the world scene second only to the level in North America (8.6%) and Oceania (17.8%).

There are two significant differences between the two migration systems in the Mediterranean area. First of all, in the case of the Gulf countries it was not the needs of a rapidly expanding economy that triggered the considerable migration flows, but rather the availability of huge amounts of capital, following the rise in oil prices, that induced these countries to launch massive plans for industrialisation and the building of infrastructures. This impressive influx of capital has mostly been towards countries whose populations are too small to use these funds with local human resources, also because the activity rates, especially for women, were very low; the literacy and educational levels of the population were likewise low. In the second place, these countries were not pluralist democracies, but societies led by hereditary monarchs who presided over non-democratic States. This has led to a policy of genuine ethnically-based discrimination of the workers, not found elsewhere, with occupational and wage gap between local and immigrant workers, with the latter being differentiated according to their place of origin.

In terms of trends, the European scenario over the past 15-20 years has been mainly characterised by flows from Eastern Europe, directed above all towards Germany, the first country to directly and most intensely experience the results of the effects of the political changes in the countries with real socialist regimes and of the subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall. There were also significant migration streams from the Middle East and North Africa. The first ones came above all from Turkey to Germany, and the subsequent ones from the Maghreb countries towards France, Spain and Italy. Though on a smaller scale, there are also flows from other

continents, showing the considerable powers of attraction of the European system, which does not just exercise its influence on the neighbouring emigration-sending countries. It is interesting to note that in North Africa only the former French colonial countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) have a strong migration link with our continent, while Turkey is virtually the only country in the Middle East. The contribution of Egypt or the other countries of Western Asia is modest, showing that at least up to now a large part of the Arab world has found other more substantial destinations.

Since the 1980s, the flows to the migration system of the Gulf countries has mostly come from the Southeast Asian countries, not only because of the lower cost and easier political management of these immigrants, but also due to the greater capacity of the institutional and social networks of these countries in exploiting the existing opportunities for insertion. As a matter of fact, at least part of the immigration is directly linked to the acquisition of contracts in the Gulf countries and, in recent years, the role of the Southeast Asian enterprises has certainly increased, flanking and replacing the European and North American ones.

In the context of the migration system of the Gulf Co-operation Council, the Gulf War was a fundamental watershed. The first consequence of the clash among the Arab countries at that time was the expulsion of the Egyptians by Iraq, and of the Jordanians, Palestinians and Yemenis by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. According to recent estimates, about 390,000 Egyptians returned home, 225,000 Jordanians and Palestinians were expelled; 723,000 Yemenis are estimated to have been forced to return to their country. It is not yet clear which direction migration has taken in the countries of the area after the end of the war. According to the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, it is likely that the immigration size in the mid-90s was the same as or greater than that recorded before the Gulf War, but with a net fall of the Arab component which has probably fallen from 30-35% of the total in 1990 to 20% in 1995.

Corrado Bonifazi


Changes in the Labour Markets

When we distribute the changes in labour supply into their three main components, population and labour participation of either men or women, the expansion of the labour supply in the Mediterranean migration-sending countries - now almost +3.5 million a year - is mainly determined by the massive arrival of the young generations on their labour markets, which causes a population surplus of about +3.2 million a year. To a lesser extent (about +450,000), there is also the advance of women in officially registered labour participation, while male activity rates reduce labour force in both very young and older ages (about -220,000).

In the labour markets of the European receiving countries (the 15 of the European Union plus Norway and Switzerland), population change now plays a secondary role with respect to the flows based on changes in the rates of labour participation. However, this is only a transition phase from a growth period to one of losses in supply of demographic origin. Therefore, the feminisation process under way in the labour force can emerge clearly (about +400,000), also in contrast with significant reductions in the labour force due to a fall in male participation rates (about -230,000). In the near future, the rise in female activity rates is thought to be the only positive component there to contrast, though inadequately, the fall in the labour supply due to the reduction of both the working-age population and male participation.

G.G.

Mediterranean Urban Agglomerations by Population Size, (2000 in millions)




Source: "Compendium of Human Settlements Statistics 1995" (United Nations), estimates

Cairo and Istanbul are the largest Mediterranean urban areas though being only 19th and 24th in the world's rank. In the next future their population will still increase because of the high growth rate they show. Most of the other agglomerations, account for medium-small population size. In the African cities high levels of population growth are recorded while on the European side, urban population is decreasing. Only Genoa is under one million inhabitants.


L.V.

Components of the average annual change in labour force supply

Mediterranean emigration countries




European immigration countries



DEMOTRENDS IN MEDIT

Country	Total population (2000, millions)	Population 0-14 yrs (2000, %)	Population 65 yrs and over (2000, %)	Median age of population (2000)	Average annual rate of population growth (1995-2000, %)	TFR (1995-2000)	Life expectancy at birth (1995-2000)	Infant mortality rate per 1000 births (1995-2000)	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$, 1997)	Human development index (1997)	Female labour participation rate (1997)
Albania	3	29	6	26.7	-0.4	2.5	72.8	30	2,120	0.699	41.5
Algeria	32	37	4	21.1	2.3	3.8	68.9	44	4,460	0.665	16.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	19	10	35.1	3.0	1.4	73.3	15
Croatia	5	17	15	38.8	-0.1	1.6	72.6	10	4,895 ^(a)	0.773	39.9
Cyprus	1	23	12	33.3	1.1	2.0	77.8	9	14,201 ^(a)	0.870	37.1
Egypt	69	35	4	22.0	1.9	3.4	66.3	51	3,050	0.616	22.2
France	59	19	16	37.6	0.4	1.7	78.1	6	22,030	0.918	39.1
Gaza Strip	1	52	3	14.4	4.3	7.3	71.3	24
Greece	11	15	18	39.4	0.3	1.3	78.1	8	12,769 ^(a)	0.867	31.3
Israel	6	28	10	28.4	2.2	2.7	77.8	8	13,150	0.883	34.1
Italy	57	14	18	40.6	0.0	1.2	78.2	7	20,290	0.900	32.9
Jordan	7	42	3	18.8	3.0	4.9	70.2	26	3,450	0.715	13.6
Lebanon	3	33	6	24.4	1.7	2.7	69.9	29	5,940	0.749	19.2
Libyan Arab Jamahiria	6	38	3	20.0	2.4	3.8	70.0	28	6,697 ^(a)	0.756	13.0
Macedonia, TFYR	2	23	10	32.2	0.6	2.1	73.1	23	3,210	0.746	38.3
Malta	0	20	12	36.1	0.7	1.9	77.2	8	13,180	0.850	20.0
Morocco	28	33	4	23.2	1.8	3.1	66.6	51	3,310	0.582	37.1
Portugal	10	16	15	37.3	0.0	1.4	75.3	9	14,270	0.858	42.4
Slovenia	2	16	14	38.1	0.0	1.3	74.5	7	11,800	0.845	45.4
Spain	40	15	17	37.9	0.0	1.2	78.0	7	15,930	0.894	31.1
Syrian Arab Republic	16	41	3	18.8	2.5	4.0	68.9	33	3,250	0.663	16.3
Tunisia	10	30	6	24.4	1.4	2.6	69.5	30	5,300	0.695	24.1
Turkey	67	28	6	25.6	1.7	2.5	69.0	45	6,350	0.728	34.9
Yugoslavia	11	20	13	35.6	0.1	1.8	72.8	18

Source: U.N., World Population Prospects; UNDP, Human Development Indicators, 1999;
^(a) Source: Heston and Summers, 1999.



MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

edited by Loredana Cerbara and Cinzia Conti

The Mediterranean countries are certainly not a homogeneous group with respect to population behaviour and social and economic structures. Together with the marked historical, cultural, religious and political differences, there are also enormous differences in the levels of wealth and in the stages of demographic and economic development.




The population structure extensively reflects many of these differences. The Asian Mediterranean countries often have a mean age far under twenty. The mean age on the North African coasts is under 24, while in Southern Europe it far exceeds these values. The maximum record is in Italy, which notoriously tops the world league for population ageing, with 18% of the total being over 65.

The annual growth rate in Italy, but also in the other European countries, is practically zero, since fertility rates, for some time far under the replacement value, are now fully causing effects in terms of population decline and ageing, and only consistent immigration flows can partially compensate for this trend. All the other countries have positive growth rates, and the few negative values (Albania and Croatia) derive, either directly or due to mass emigration, from the wars that have affected these populations over recent years.

The relationship between Total Fertility Rate and Life Expectancy shows how the Mediterranean countries are in different stages of demographic transition. The European countries provide a decisive contrast with those in the other two continental areas where the continuing high fertility levels are associated with a life-expectancy that never reaches 70, and an infant mortality rate as much as five times the European average.

The economic structures in these countries are the result of various components, not the least of which cultural and religious, that in many countries still limit female participation levels on the official labour market. The average annual rate of growth of the GDP per capita (1990-2000) shows that there are countries which have had a particularly high rate of economic development over the past decade, in contrast with the more developed areas where progress is tangible but with slower rates.

The human development index, taking into account income and education levels as well as life expectancy at birth, summarises the wide gap between the countries on both the social and the economic level. On the lower end of the scale, we find the North African countries followed by the Asian and Balkan nations, while the most developed countries are obviously in Western Europe.



Statistical Co-operation in the Mediterranean Basin

The joint Declaration of the Barcelona Conference (12 Mediterranean partners and 15 EU member states, held in November 1995) stressed the importance attached to permanent and balanced economic development to create an area of prosperity shared across the Mediterranean basin. In this context, the progressive adoption of a free trade area and the strengthening of the relations between the members of the European Union and the Mediterranean countries has showed the need to have reliable, harmonised and up to date statistics.

In the countries of the southern and eastern banks of the Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) there has been a culture of statistics for some decades. This culture is based on the presence of statisticians both within the National Statistical Institutes and in the other national public and private sectors, and also on the existence of statistical practices in the production of data (censuses, surveys), publication of data and their uses by a large public and by decision-makers.

However, the situation of the National Statistical Systems is rather heterogeneous. Comprehension of the social situation of the Mediterranean countries is generally very limited while demand by the policy makers and private decision-makers is becoming greater. Labour market statistics have very often been found to be weak and the dissemination of social indicators relating to living conditions and poverty are very rare.

In the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), population issues as well as the sources used or potential are similar: there is a special interest in population growth and its well being, education and protection. Likewise, there is a big interest in labour force and unemployment issues. Against this background of interest, very few statistics are currently available. There is a keenness and awareness among the various interested Ministries, including, of course, the National Statistical Institutes, that population issues should be developed through enhancing existing sources and co-ordination of interested bodies.

Jordan, Egypt and Syria, are showing interesting developments of their statistical systems, particularly in the areas of migrations, education and social protection. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), instead recently born, is a small very dynamic institute that in few years succeed in building up a sufficiently reliable set of surveys and carry out a Population Census (1997). Lebanon is recovering from a long and devastating civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1991: consequently, there are many practical needs on, for example, education, vocational training, action plans to deal with child labour and setting up new employment offices. Improving the statistical systems to meet user needs is just one.

Finally Cyprus, Israel, Malta and Turkey, which statistical systems are fully developed, already started the process of harmonisation with the European standards, particularly advanced in Cyprus and Malta since their Governments are about to start the discussions with the European Commission for their accession to the Union.

In this context, MEDSTAT, a statistical co-operation programme financed by the European Union, has been set up and some priority fields have been identified, such as statistics on: migrations, tourism, transports, external trade, environment, national accounts and the estimation of the Non Observed Economy (NOE).

Among these, CESD Roma with the technical supervision of ISTAT, since 1997 is responsible for the implementation of the projects related to migration statistics (MED MIGR), transport statistics (MED TRANS) and for the estimation of NOE (MED NOE). In addition, bilateral programmes are being implemented with PCBS on Labour Force Survey, and, jointly with the University of Siena, a research programme on poverty measurement has been agreed again with PCBS and the Statistical Institute of Morocco.

Salvatore Favazza and Samia Kouider
CESD-Roma

A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

Comparing Different Lives

Problems and Solutions in International Socio-Economic Indicators

Socio-economic indicators are an attempt to measure the *non-measurable*. Social and economic phenomena usually evade an indisputable and objective measurement, compared to natural sciences. The social scientist defines the aspects of human life, for example education, to measure and translate these aspects into socio-economic indicators, such as years of schooling, or reading and writing abilities. The use of socio-economic indicators cannot be separated from socio-economic policies and the attempt to improve living conditions of populations. The idea is that information is a fundamental ingredient of the creation and formulation of policies in the economic, social, educational, health and environmental areas. Socio-economic indicators are used on the national and international level. Since there is no standardisation of political, social and cultural choices, attempts to formulate international indicators inevitably involve the problem of non-standard sources and availability data. Statistical sources as well as the same phenomena to be measured vary from country to country and the problem of international comparison for their definition and measurement is far from being solved.

The efforts of international agencies, predominantly of the UN system, have brought about a certain homogenisation of the definition and collection of statistics. Usually, the international institutions go a long way to assure comparability. But much obviously depends on the strengths

or weaknesses of the statistical systems collecting data in the various countries, as well as on the particular data-collection systems. It is therefore not always possible to obtain information allowing for cross-country and inter-temporal compar-

and other indicators (Gross domestic product, development indicators) to measure most aspects of social development. These data are very attentive to the aspect of international comparison and standardisation, especially in the economic field. As a last example, we cite the human development index, prepared for the human-development report of UN Development Program, which is a composite index based on standardisation - in reference to the minimum and maximum values -

	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$, 1997)	Human Development Indicator (HDI, 1997)	Difference in rank for real GDP per capita and HDI
France	22,030	0.918	4
Italy	20,290	0.900	2
Spain	15,930	0.894	9
Israel	18,150	0.883	3
Turkey	6,350	0.728	-22
Tunisia	5,300	0.695	-34
Algeria	4,460	0.665	-31
Egypt	3,050	0.616	-14
Morocco	3,310	0.582	-27

Note: The GDP converted to US dollars by the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate allows a comparison of GDP at real price levels between countries. A negative difference in rank occurs when human development is not in step with economic development. Source: Human Development Report (<http://www.undp.org/hdro/>), see also the World Development Report (<http://www.worldbank.org/>)

expectancy, educational attainment (adult literacy and combined gross enrolment rate)-, ment Product) per capita, with equal weight to each component. This composite index facilitates the classification of countries according to human development. Needless to say, not everybody agrees that the components taken into account can adequately measure human development. It can be argued that the components are certainly not independent and that economic development remains the underlying component.

But socio-economic indicators represent the most effective instrument we have to inform and to decide which political initiatives can contribute to the improvement of the quality of life; they thus have a basic importance while not being exempted from the criticism often made.

Loredana Cerbara and Frank Heins

Uncertainty in Future Trends

Population Projections Facing Changing Social and Demographic Behaviour

In most population projections, no sub-populations are considered, with the notable exception of regional population projections or population projections for foreign and native populations. In most cases of demographic scenario, the changes in social and demographic behaviour and resulting changes in fertility, mortality and migration are implicitly taken into account by formulating hypotheses based on past trends. Undoubtedly, however, one of the possible strategies for forecasting the most reliable

scenarios is to use population sub-groups. Recently, Y. Courbage of the French Institute for Population Research proposed for the case of the south-eastern shores of the Mediterranean (countries still experiencing fundamental social and demographic changes) forecast scenarios based on

Population in some countries of the Mediterranean basin, 1995 and 2020 (millions)

	1995	2020				Population scenarios by Courbage	
		United Nations Projections			1st scenario	2nd scenario	
		Low variant	Medium variant	High variant			
Algeria	28.5	41.2	43.9	46.2	39.9	40.8	
Egypt	62.3	84.1	90.5	96.8	89.6	95.0	
Morocco	26.0	34.2	36.7	39.2	36.3	37.4	
Tunisia	8.9	11.4	12.3	13.1	12.3	12.4	
Turkey	61.3	77.4	84.2	89.9	83.8	84.0	

Source: Courbage, Y. (1998) Scenari demografici mediterranei.

La fine dell'esplosione. Courbage, Y. (1999) Nouveaux horizons démographiques en Méditerranée.

United Nations (1999) World population prospects.

the sub-division of the population into sub-groups according to women's educational attainment. From Courbage's viewpoint, who concentrates mainly on the fertility aspect - considered to be the most important component for population growth - all indicators necessary to reconstruct the social and


economic scenario affecting reproductive behaviour cannot be estimated. However, we can examine the female educational attainment defined as an "... excellent indicator to reflect the characteristics associated with the various social classes" and having an especially discriminating effect on fertility. In fact, international studies identify female education as a key variable in the development process. To implement this approach, Y. Courbage formulates two scenarios. The first scenario reflects the 'most probable'

path of fertility decline differentiated by educational attainment of women. Female educational attainment is generally increasing and, accordingly, the respective weights of the sub-populations are changing. The second scenario is more pessimistic and the average speed of the fertility decline is cut in half.

The table shows the total population in the various scenarios presented by the UN and Y. Courbage for some Mediterranean countries. The difficulties encountered by population researchers in forecasting trends in social and demographic behaviour are reflected in the possibility of forecasting, on the basis of different assumptions, a wide range of scenarios, which may sometimes show considerable differences. Nevertheless, in a comparison of the most likely scenarios, i.e. the "medium variant" one of the UN projections and Courbage's first scenario, we see that in general the projection results are very similar. Only in the case of Algeria, Courbage is clearly more optimistic regarding a fertility decline, with 4 million Algerians less in 2020. Interestingly, the range given by the UN is, in the case of Algeria, narrower than for the other countries. Only for Egypt, the most populous of the countries under study, we observe considerable differences between the two Courbage's scenarios, indicating the existing differences and uncertainties with respect to social development. These results indicate the importance and significance of socio-economic processes for the demographic trends in the countries in transition at our doorstep. But only in 20 years, we will know who picked the right numbers.

Cinzia Conti and Frank Heins

Life expectancy at birth for both sexes



Egyptian Immigration in Italy

Main Results of an IRP Field Survey

The Survey

In 1997, the IRP conducted a survey on Egyptian immigrants in Italy in order to collect individual, family and contextual features affecting the decision to migrate. The research study is part of a broader project on the causes of international migrations, financed by the Eurostat and co-ordinated by the NIDI, including surveys in five immigrant-sending countries in the Mediterranean region (Turkey, Morocco and Egypt), in Sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal and Ghana) and in two immigrant-receiving countries of Southern Europe (Italy and Spain).

The definition of the survey field was determined by the need to obtain comparable data from the various countries participating in the project. Therefore, in order to narrow the range of potential respondents, attention was focused on recent migrants in each family, i.e. individuals aged 18-65 who were born in the emigration country and who were 18 years or older at the time of their last migration from the country. Among the latter, those who had been in the host country for at least three months and no more than 10 years were defined as Main Migration Actors (MMA).

On the basis of an analysis of the characteristics of Egyptian emigration in Italy, a careful selection was made of the places to conduct the field survey in order to provide comparable data on a national level. The sampling technique chosen involves a sample based on aggregation points, i.e. places where immigrants congregate for specific purposes (administrative reasons, religion, social contacts, leisure and so on).

In the case of the Egyptians, a total of 745 immigrants were interviewed, among whom 709 recent migrants, subdivided into 503 main migration actors and 166 potential main migration actors, and 76 family members not falling within these two categories (migrants with other characteristics or non-migrants). A very large sample considering that the regular Egyptian immigrants were 23,500 at the beginning of the year. On the whole, the female component is considerably reduced, forming only 29% of the total of the interviewees.

Italy, the Favourite Destination

Survey data show a typically male migration model, characterised by a significant number of men who were unmarried when leaving Egypt. Just over one man out

of ten of the main migration actors brought his family along to Italy immediately or later, 17.7% left their wife at home and the rest stated that they were unmarried at the time of departure. Female migration, on the other hand, is very low and has a strictly family-related or couple-related character, with about two thirds of Egyptian women immigrants already having their partner in Italy.

There were very few immigrants with a complex migratory process divided into several stages. For almost all of them, Italy was the first international destination, reached after a short time, generally by air and without intermediate stops.

At the time of the last emigration from their country of origin, the great majority of the interviewees were economically active and many migrants were employed. On the whole, 44% of the men and 33.4% of the women declared they were employed (as employees or as employers) and if we add those who were casual workers or had other work, the figure is 70.4% for men and 54.2% for women. In any case, the unemployment levels should not be underestimated (though they are no higher than those recorded in many provinces of Southern Italy) affected by gender differences, with higher unemployment rates among women than among men (respectively 25.0% and 16.3%).

On the basis of these data, and considering that the initial economic context differs profoundly from the one in Italy, emigration does not appear to be just the result of lack of work or of the unstable nature of the employment available (only 15.2% of the sample states the first reason for last emigration as 'could not find job') but rather the result of a more general pressure on the whole of society due to the income differential between emigration and immigration areas. If we consider the assessment given to the adequacy of the financial situation of the household before last emigration, the majority of Egyptians consider the financial situation to be sufficient or more than sufficient.

When the interviewees were asked to indicate the first reason inducing them to choose Italy, strong gender differences emerged. The first factor was the possibility of finding a job and improving income for men (with 37.3%), followed by the presence of relatives and friends (27.6%). Among women, there was a net prevalence of family-related reasons, with 52.3% indicating the reason as being to 'accompany or follow spouse', while only 17.5% mention the possibility of finding job and improving their income. The migratory process induc-

ing the Egyptians to go to Italy did not involve a blind initiative. Over two thirds of migrants had initial information on Italy before migrating and about 60% had a network in Italy before departure. For the males, the network consisted of friends/non-relatives (62.4%) while for the women in almost all cases the contact was the spouse/partner (94.1%). We should not underestimate the fact that 3 Egyptians out of 10 had no information; in these cases, the choice was probably made solely on the basis of push factors.

One of the biggest obstacles the interviewees may have found in the migratory process bringing them to Italy is undoubtedly the difficulty in obtaining the necessary entry documents. Just over two out of ten Egyptian men confessed having entered Italy without a visa or permit, while almost all the women entered legally. There is no doubt as to the sincerity of the answers on the subsequent specifications of the type of permit. As a matter of fact, the majority reported a tourist visa (76.7%), indicating an immigration route that is clearly irregular but widespread because it is easy to utilise.

On the whole, despite the gender differences, the educational level is very high (30% of the interviewees say they have a university degree). Educational qualifications seem to be a selective factor in the migration choice. The fact that this selected population undertakes occupations wholly unrelated to their educational qualifications induces reflection on the impoverishing effect of migration.

Knowledge of the language has an undoubted effect on insertion in the Italian productive process, being an important factor for integration and exchange. In this respect the survey showed, though on the basis of the simple declarations of the interviewees, a good rate of knowledge of Italian (83.5%). Lack of knowledge of the language is associated with unemployment for men and housewife status for the women.

Despite the relative stability from the occupational viewpoint and an overall satisfaction for the country chosen (67% of the MMAs would be willing to go back to Italy), the basic impression is that the migration experience is generally seen as a temporary plan, though not necessarily short term. Asked for an opinion on future intentions, only 31.8% intend to stay in Italy, 35.5% have no opinion and 29.6% intend to go back to their own country.

Corrado Bonifazi and Miria Savioli

THE ADRIATIC COAST: A PUZZLE OF PEOPLE


Among the problems of the Mediterranean area, environmental concern for water pollution, coastal degradation, tourist pressure, transport management, health and land use, is increasing. The environmental dimension requires a local and an international outlook, with multidisciplinary competencies and research. The focus of the PRISMA project (a research for safeguarding the Adriatic Sea, involving 101 research units from all sectors of sea sciences), is the Adriatic coast of Italy. This narrow fringe accounts for 3.5 million people, for 7 cities over 100,000 inhabitants, attracts national and international tourist flows, and many industrial facilities are settled along this coast.

While it is often hard to document the direct causes of the problem of environmental quality, it is very clear that these problems derive from the development model of the coast. The radical changes in the functioning of the natural systems and the fact that with the growth of coastal population and settlements, many of these places have become less attractive, are factors obvious to everyone. Public opinion has focused on the coastal-environment quality on an occasional basis, as a result of emotional reactions triggered by disasters, but the increasing occurrence of these episodes makes people aware of how serious and widespread this problem is.

The approach adopted by the IRP research unit for the *Analysis of the Impact of the Population Factor on the Adriatic Sea Ecosystem* in the PRISMA2 Programme has taken into account two primary needs. Firstly, there is the need to provide decision-makers, business managers, and the population of the coastal areas with tools to interpret demographic trends and to make methods available to identify the possible growth and development patterns. Secondly, there is a need to monitor and analyse the attitudes, opinions and perceptions of the environmental concern of the population living in the coastal environment.

The map shows one of the results of the research of the IRP unit, an answer for the first set of requirements. It shows the mapping of the Adriatic municipalities according to the demographic, economic and social characteristics of the people living there. It is a product applying statistical methods to provide a summary of the major homogeneous aspects of the settlements on the Adriatic coast. It represents a major achievement in the collection, filing and processing of data and provides an immediate representation of complex information. Its use is, therefore, not only limited to the scientific sphere, but is also for users who are not specialists or from other disciplines.

M. M.





Workshop of the Feasibility Project

**Social Sciences
and the new crisis in the Balkans**

under the High Patronage of the
Presidence of the Italian Republic

Roma, Tuesday, June 27, 2000
CNR, Aula Convegni
Piazzale Aldo Moro 7

The frequent occurrence of crisis situations in the Balkan region, especially in the territory of former Yugoslavia, calls for the creation of a solid, shared cultural background able to provide the proper knowledge resources to form a basis for actions by politics and the social actors, as well as helping public opinion to make informed, attentive assessments as to the requirements of international solidarity.

There is a need to create tools for analysis and study applicable on various levels, and in this specific case, tools based on the awareness of the variety of experiences and history of the people living in the southern Balkans.

The Conference collects together the various proposals in the context of a CNR Feasibility Project, with the addition of experience and projects implemented in the area by other bodies and organisations. The Conference is an important occasion for discussion between the research sector and the institutions in order to plan the future commitments of the CNR in an area, which is increasingly important for Italy.

PROGRAMME

9.30 Opening Workshop

Lucio Bianco, *President of the CNR*

Welcome Address

Ministry of the Interior
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Social Solidarity
Equal Opportunity Commission

Invited report: Sara Cabibbo, *Third Rome University*

11.00 Session I: Culture, Identity and Rights

Chairperson: Giuseppe Gesano, *IRP - CNR*

Invited report: Mariella Pandolfi,
Montreal University

Contribution: Graziana Campanato,
*Italian Association
of Women Magistrates*

Debate

**12.00 Session II: Historical Paths, Political Processes
and Training Needs**

Chairperson: Sara Cabibbo

Invited report: Jože Pirjevec, *Trieste University*

Contributions: Josè Luis Rhi Sausi,
*CeSPI - Centre for Studies
on International Policies*
Piro Misha, *Soros Foundation*

Debate

Lunch

15.00 Session III: Population, Conflicts and Differences

Chairperson: Rossella Palomba, *IRP - CNR*

Invited report: Corrado Bonifazi, *IRP - CNR*

Contributions: Luca Einaudi, *Prime Minister's Office*
Anna Torraco,
*Association of Women
in the Mediterranean Countries*

Debate

16.00 Session IV: Economy, Solidarity and Development

Chairperson: Gilberto Antonelli, *IDSE - CNR*

Invited report: Milica Uvalic, *Perugia University*

Contributions: Giorgio Gomel,
International Relations - Bank of Italy
Orlando Arango,
European Investment Bank

Debate

17.00 Concluding Remarks

Gilberto Antonelli, *IDSE - CNR*

Joint World Bank/European Commission web site:

Economic Reconstruction
and Development in South East Europe
<http://www.seerecon.org>

World Bank

Europe and Central Asia Regional Site
Webpage: <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf>

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

South-east Europe Regional Economic Prospects, External
Financing Needs, and IMF Programs Webpage:
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/eu1/see/INDEX.HTM#tab1>

United nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Kosovo links
<http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo/latest.htm>

United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

Webpage:
<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm>

UNICEF

Balkan Region
Webpage: <http://www.unicef.org/balkans/>

Royaumont Initiative for South-Eastern Europe

Webpage: <http://www.royaumont.org/>

Reliefweb

Serving the information needs of the humanitarian
relief community
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf>

NATO

<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/jnt-grdn.htm>

Stability pact for South-Eastern Europe

Web page: <http://www.stabilitypact.org/>

South-Eastern Europe Press releases

Webpage: <http://www.seerecon.org/PressReleases/PressReleases.htm>

South-Eastern Europe Business and Investment opportunities

Webpage:
<http://www.seerecon.org/BusinessOpportunities/BusinessOpportunities.htm>

World food Program (WFP)

Crisis in the Balkans
<http://www.wfp.org/kosovoalert/index.htm>

SEECN

South East European Educational Cooperation network
Webpage: <http://www.see-educoop.net/>

World Health Organization (WHO)

Webpage: <http://www.who.dk/cpa/kosovo/welcome.htm>

World Crime Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

<http://www.un.org/icty/latest.htm>

SECI

Southest Europe Cooperation initiative
Webpage: <http://www.unece.org/seci/>

European initiatives

European Investment Bank (EIB)

Kosovo Task force
<http://www.eib.org/pub/news/btf/info.htm>

**European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD)**

Financing the economic transition in central and eastern
Europe and the CIS Webpage: <http://www.ebrd.org>

Phare programme for South-Eastern Europe

website:
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/index.htm>

Obnova programme for South-Eastern Europe

Website: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/obnova/index.htm>

**1991-1999 EU assistance to South-Eastern Europe
& Western Balkans**

Webpage:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/figures/see_balkans_support_91_99.htm

The EU and South-Eastern Europe

Opening up new perspectives for South-Eastern Europe: The
Stabilisation and Association Process
Web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/intro/index.htm

**Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE)**

OSCE Mission in Kosovo <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/>

ECHO

Webpage: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/kosovo/index.html>

BOOKS: RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Giuseppe Gesano, Adele Menniti, Maura Misiti, Rossella Palomba, L'Osservatorio italiano sulle aspettative di fecondità. (The Italian Observatory on Fertility Expectations.)

W.P. 1/00 Giugno 2000

Starting from December 1998, IRP conducts an annual survey on fertility intentions with the aim to identify and study the evolution over time of the reproductive pattern of the Italian population.

The survey, called Italian Observatory on Fertility Expectations, is a telephone survey (C.A.T.I. system); the sample consists of 1,500 women aged 20 to 40, married and unmarried. The main questions of the survey regard the intention to have children in the next two years and the total number of desired children. The Working Paper deals with the description of the survey's results. An analysis of the Italian fertility is also included.

DEMOTRENDS

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The most recent issues of Demotrends are available on the IRP website

SPEAKING ABOUT...

Demographic Transition is called the process of transition from a situation in which both fertility and mortality were relatively high to one in which they are relatively low which has been observed in many countries.

Median Age is the age which divides the population into two numerically equal groups.

Life expectancy is the mean number of years to be lived by

those surviving to exact age x, given the mortality conditions of a life table.

Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths under one year of age out of 1,000 live births of the same year.

Total fertility rate is the average number of children ever born from a women during her fertility age period.