

# demotrends

quadrimestrale sulla realtà demografica italiana

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
## Four Years of Italian Population Trends

**D**emotrends was launched four years ago on the occasion of the IUSSP Conference in Beijing. We presented Italy as a laboratory which was observed with curiosity and interest by scholars and policy makers in the developed world since the Italian population was undergoing a somewhat unusual process of modernisation in its demographic behaviour.

During these last four years many things have changed, although not as regards the variables used to measure the status and dynamics of the population but rather in the context in which demographically significant attitudes, choices and concrete behaviour are developing.

Italy has succeeded in joining the euro area by making a considerable number of cuts to a public spending regime that was as generous as it was unbalanced in its basic parameters. Initially, this may have lowered expectations in some parts of the country or in some strata of the population, in particular among those whose choices as regards the formation and growth of their families and of staying put or migrating were guided by the availability of state welfare benefits or by hopes of employment in the public sector. In the long run however, there emerged greater trust in the future, both because we had joined the "European train" embracing a common destiny and also because of the elements of stability induced by the restructuring, for example in terms of the control of the public debt and inflation. Production and the economy were thus able to move ahead again from a more secure basis and the recovery produced a steady growth in employment and a reduction in unemployment. The areas most affected have once again been those in the North and the Centre, but some fairly extensive areas in the South have also been involved in the processes of development and release from the constraints of a society and an economy that are still not fully modernised.

One might wonder to what extent the Italian population of the country, with its age structure and territorial distribution,



may have encouraged or contrasted these changes. The marked ageing of the demographic structure already gives Italy one of the highest percentages of over-65 year-olds in the world and, given the reduced size of the younger generations, the outlook is for a decidedly worse ratio of old people to the working population, especially in the period between 2020 and 2040. These concerns have already brought about changes in pension regimes and the rules regarding retirement and the situation is being closely monitored. Nevertheless a lack of young people is now appearing in the areas where the reduction in fertility first began or where it has been more rapid and decisive, having significant effects on the more dynamic work markets and on less pleasant or less well-paid

jobs. As a result, the spatial mobility of the population is picking up again, both as regards changes of residence (still mainly from South to North), and in terms of short or long-distance commuting. Furthermore, and in particular in some cities and areas, the foreign community has become more numerous and more settled although the situation in Italy is by no means as well developed as in other European countries.

Foreign immigration has however become one of the hot topics of political debate and in the mass media. On the one hand, there are some problems of coexistence and presumed security problems and, on the other, an input of foreign workers is necessary: in this latter perspective efforts to integrate foreign workers and their families into the hosting society are also necessary. In 1998 a law was approved on "Immigration regulations and rules regarding the condition of foreigners". On the basis of this law, some provisions were made to allow foreigners to become legal to encourage the use of social services (school, health services, etc.) on the part of immigrants. Agreements were also made with some sending countries in order to limit entries. Nevertheless, the problem of illegal immigration cannot be said to have been resolved, partly due to the particular geographical position of Italy and the existence of political and ethnic tensions in nearby areas.

Various interventions have been made on some other aspects connected with the demographic situation and related individual behaviour. Italy has not adopted any openly pro-birth policies but has preferred to support mother and fatherhood by allowing parents who work to take longer periods of leave without risking their jobs, and a birth allowance has been introduced for parents with more serious economic or social difficulties. The problem of assistance for the elderly who are no longer physically independent has been directed mainly towards boosting care-in-the-home services and recognising and supporting family responsibilities in the framework of a wider system integrating interventions and social services for those in need.

It is still too soon to assess the effectiveness of such interventions which, what is more, have been more correctly set up in terms of social policy addressed to the population.

Giuseppe Gesano

## Should the gaps be filled?

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The modest objective of ensuring a constant 20-year-old cohort in Italy implies net immigration of between 100,000 and 200,000 a year. Keeping the entire working-age population constant would demand between 200,000 and 600,000. Let us set these figures in historical perspective. Italy's shaky statistics show an increase in the foreign population between 1989 and 1999 of about a million, largely through the regularisation of people having entered the country illegally. So even in the recent past, certainly not the happiest of experiences given the uncertainty or poor application of immigration law, the foreign population has been growing at around 100,000 a year, unquestionably a considerable figure.

How many immigrants will be needed in the future? The answer is political more than scientific. For several decades at least, a country could theoretically afford to have no children and adopt none. The surviving population would convert all their resources into financial assets, investing in world markets and importing the goods needed. Service companies (employing transient foreign workers, who would thus not acquire claim to permanent resident status) would provide for health, entertainment, culture, transportation, maintenance, etc. Albeit with different mechanisms and origins, this is how such states as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,

Montecarlo and Vatican City actually do survive and thrive.

Excluding such paradoxical cases, however, let us consider to what extent, and how, a country like Italy could afford not to plug its demographic gaps.

**Intensification of work.** This is the first, obvious course. Italian employment rates are among the lowest in Europe – especially for women, though their rate is rising strongly, and for people older than 50. If age-specific employment rates of men and of women in the population aged 15-64 were to remain constant, total employment would contract by nearly a quarter, from 21 million to 16.2 million, between 2000 and 2025. If on the other hand in 2025 female employment rates were up to the present male rates, total employment would hold unchanged at about 21 million. This exercise ignores the not exactly minor detail that a third of all persons employed in 2025 would be over 50 (compared to one fifth now), while nowhere is the female employment rate equal to the male. Even so, it shows that at least until 2025 the numerical stability of employment is not incompatible, in the abstract, with demographics. After that date the situation would degenerate, and by 2050 keeping employment at 21 million would require that virtually all men and women of working age (15-64) be gainfully employed; 94 per cent, to be exact, meaning everyone except the handicapped.

There are other ways of attaining an intensification of work, such as an increase in the number of hours worked in a year or extending working age beyond 65. In any event, one would ultimately find oneself scraping the bottom of the barrel and interfering with other socially necessary activities (the care of children, for example).

**Raising productivity.** This is outside the field of demography, but it is hard to imagine how productivity gains in Italy could long maintain a faster pace than in our competitors, with which we are, moreover, closely integrated. Britain and France, for example, will have a practically unchanged population of working age over the next 25 years, so they can keep total employment constant at their present employment rates. In Italy, these present rates imply a 25 per cent contraction in total employment. Supposing Italy does not want to see its real gross output diminish by comparison with those of Britain and France, and that the latter achieve a 2 per cent annual rate increase in productivity, Italy would have to have yearly productivity gains of 2.9 per cent to keep up. For Italy to outstrip its main rivals in productivity by nearly half again for a quarter of a century on end is virtually inconceivable.

**Increasing mobility.** As in most other European countries, but perhaps more markedly, internal mobility has diminished in the course of the decades. The reason are varied and complex, bearing first of all on the higher cost of migration, which has risen more than the overall cost of living. Other causes include the greater difficulty of moving for families in which more than one person is employed; the aging of the population; institutional obstacles such as the geographical levelling of earnings or the imperfect housing market. In particular, there is very little migration now from the regions with high unemployment and low employment to those where the reverse obtains. In April 2000 the unemployment rate in the South of Italy was 21 per cent, more than three times that of the rest of the country (6.1 per cent), and the gap is much

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# Context and perspectives of Italian migration flows

*Growth in immigration and recovery in inter-regional migration*

**T**his last decade represents an important moment in the development of the Italian migration system. In particular, some processes linked to foreign immigration have reached full maturity, provoking a lively - if not always calm and objective - debate in society and the political world. Other processes, such as those tied to inter-regional migration from the South to the Centre-North of the country have been reinvigorated, proving in practice that this type of mobility has by no means disappeared altogether.

So, on the one hand, we have noted a growth in the number of foreigners and the fact that the immigrant communities are progressively putting down roots and, on the other, we have been faced with a recovery in the emigration flows from the South to the rest of the country. These two phenomena are nevertheless by no means contradictory if we take into account the profound regional differences in levels of economic and social development and if we consider that the labour market is not a single entity but a set of many local and sectoral markets that are highly differentiated in terms of qualifications, professional skills, age, gender and now also of ethnic origin.

Throughout the developed world, the 1990s saw growing concern on the part of public opinion regarding immigration and an increase in government efforts to control and limit the inflows. Italy was certainly no exception, mainly because proximity to the African and Balkan coasts means that the country is one of the natural frontiers of the European Union with the emigration areas. These dynamics have contributed to making the political aspects even more important in the determination of the characteristics of immigration. This political dimension is increasingly taking on supranational importance. Thus, on the one hand, national policies suffer more and more from the immigration choices made by the European Union and, on the other, there is a growing awareness that controlling inflows and combating illegal immigration cannot be carried out without general collaboration agreements with the sending countries whose political and economic stability is becoming an essential prerequisite for

the success of any kind of intervention.

It should also be recognised that since the end of the 1980s, Italy has called for a more important role for the EU in the determination of migration policy and more active intervention in terms of cooperation with the sending countries. However, these efforts have not always led to consistent choices and behaviour, especially at national level, thus leaving our European partners perplexed on more than one occasion.

The Tampere summit and the debate conducted in some countries have marked the emergence of more open positions on the subject of immigration in the context of the EU. The idea is taking hold that immigration is not only something to be controlled but may also be an important opportunity for growth and development in the receiving country. Population trends and the need to compete at global level with more competitive productive systems like the north American one in the acquisition of human resources will surely help to create a more favourable context for this change of direction.

In this sense, the new Italian law is certainly an interesting example, if not a model, of an attempt to maintain an active policy on immigration flows. We should not forget however that a change of this type means a radical review of the very philosophy that has always guided migration policies in most European countries. Policies used to be based mainly on a "pauperistic" view of immigration, the main purpose of which was to fill in the gaps at the bottom of the employment ladder, and for this reason, little attention was paid to encouraging the integration, participation and social mobility of the new arrivals.

**I**n quantitative terms, between 1992 and the end of 1999, the number of foreigners with a sojourn permit more than doubled, going from 590,000 to 1,341,000. This growth was mainly determined by two amnesty laws in the second part of the last decade. However, this figure only gives a partial measurement of the legal foreign presence, since not all minors are included by the statistical sources used. The number of legal foreign immigrants at the end of 1999 should

therefore be increased by about 170,000 thus giving a final figure of 1,510,000.

As regards legal immigration, 62% of foreigners come to Italy for work and 25% for family reasons. As far as place of origin is concerned, in the 1990s the weight of immigration from the developed countries continued to fall to below 17% of sojourn permits issued. At the same time, there was a big increase in immigration from eastern Europe (27%) while immigrants from the developing countries made up 56% of the total.

Recent dynamics indicate a much more active role in the migration process on the part of the demand for labour. In many highly industrialised areas in the Centre-North, the economic dynamics have more or less exhausted local labour supplies forcing enterprises to employ immigrant workers, with a significant increase in the pull factors towards the central sectors of the national economy. Amongst other things, this has sparked off a process of territorial and employment mobility for immigrants, from the South to the North and from illegal, marginal occupations to legal and steady jobs.

Looking at the internal migration flows between the South and the rest of the country, in 1988 foreigners accounted for 6% of emigration and 10% of the balance. Domestic emigration from the South has grown in recent years, reaching 129,000 in 1998 and giving place to a migration loss of 68,500 people. Such a marked change had not been seen since 1974 and the overall loss between 1995 and 1998 was 233,000. The age profile of the migration balance clearly shows that we are facing strong flows linked to imbalances in the labour market: 61% of the loss involved people aged between 20 and 34 years of age.


A growth in immigration and a recovery in domestic inter-regional migration are the two most significant aspects of recent dynamics in the national migration system. These two elements create a complex and multifaceted picture with many interrelations thus accurately reflecting Italian society as a whole.

*Corrado Bonifazi*

## Urbanisation trends in Italy 1951-1999

During the 1950s and 1960s Italy experienced a concentration of the population and a process of urbanisation. These rural to urban moves are accompanied with moves from Southern to Northern-Central regions and from mountainous zones to low lying areas. Today small local labour market areas continue to lose population, while the intermediate ones continue to grow. The population loss of Italian agglomerations observed in the 1980s stopped in the 1990s.

*F.H*




Note: local labour market areas are based on 1991 commuting patterns



## Domestic workers by citizenship and main Italian geographical divisions: National Institute of Social Security registers 1991-98

According to data from the National Institute of Social Security (INPS), in 1998 there were over 200,000 regularly employed domestic workers employed in Italian families, 52% of whom were Italians and the remaining 48% foreigners. In particular, the share of foreign workers noticeably increased during the 1990s to such an extent that in the Centre-North there were more foreign than national domestic workers by 1996. The growing presence of foreign domestic workers has partially mitigated the degree of feminisation of this type of activity. Amongst national workers, in fact, the proportion of women in the period under consideration has always been over 95% both in the North and in the South, whereas amongst foreign workers, the percentage of women fluctuates between 70 and 77%, with higher percentages in the North (79% in 1998) than in the South (69.3% in the same year).

*D. S.*



# Modernity and Tradition in Family Life

*The behaviour of couples is changing without important breaks from the past*

**A**lthough Italy is in the lead as regards population ageing and the decline in fertility, it does not entirely share those attributes that would identify the so-called 'second demographic transition'.

There is in fact little or no sign of those changes that elsewhere have accompanied the reduction in fertility to below the replacement level even if Italians have unmistakably been freed from religious dictates concerning sexuality and birth control and it is equally clear that women have rapidly and noticeably improved their own situation within the family and society as a whole. In particular, the institution of marriage has been weakened only slightly whereas in other countries there is a high incidence of unmarried cohabitation, of marriage break-ups resulting in divorce and the consequent establishment of one-parent families or step families.

Marriage is still the preferred environment for almost all the reproductive plans of Italian couples. These plans almost always involve a limited number of children, but they are far from not wanting any children. The great majority of married couples still intends to have at least one child, and most would like two. There are nevertheless some signs suggesting that the new generations are moving closer to the behaviour of other young Europeans, because of the progressive delay in getting married and starting a family – a delay which for an increasing number of men and women may or will lead to a definitive relinquishment of these events. The incidence of divorce, however, continues to be fairly low in Italy.

In Italy, leaving home continues to be closely tied to the fact of settling down – in most cases, as previously mentioned, in a traditional way by getting married. However this step is taken later and later (the mean age at first marriage for men is 29 and for women 26 years) and, as a result, grown-up children continue to live with their parents for a long time even when their studies have been concluded and sometimes even after starting work.

Various explanations have been advanced for these unusual behaviour patterns on the part of young Italians, both in terms of ideology or custom and as regards material factors. Some of these are linked to the enormous value that is still given in Mediterranean countries to the family – in its wider sense of the family network surrounding the married couple. Amongst these values, in particular as regards children, there is great willingness on the part of families to invest time, money and hopes in their offspring. Other interpretations, assessing the amount of help given by one generation to the next – and not only financial help, that encourage young people to live at home, underline the loss of usefulness and the lowering of the standard of living that children experience on gaining independence.

Lastly, it has been observed that this usually happens in geographical or social contexts where the lack of secure employment opportunities, problems in the housing market or structural shortcomings in services for families create objective difficulties for young people who might otherwise wish to leave the nest.

Cohabitation is not very common in Italy (less than 2% of couples) and even in those areas of society that are more advanced from an economic or cultural point of view, it is by no means as widespread as it is in northern Europe. What is more, in Italy, younger people are unlikely to live together without getting married. Making the union official seems to be a prerequisite for having children since although the share of out-of-wedlock births is increasing, it is still less than 10% of total births.

**A**ll these various factors have led women on average to delay having children until after the age of 28 years while a cohort analysis showed that childless women comprise almost half the total number of 30-year-old women and a little less than a quarter of those aged 35. On the other hand, as regards the generations that can be considered to have completed their reproductive cycle, the "two children" model prevails – about 2 women in 5 have two children by the time they reach their 40th birthday. The data reveal a contrast that restricts the room for manoeuvre for cohorts that are still of child-bearing age and this leads us to wonder if for them it is a question of a postponement or a definitive choice not to have children. There are in fact strong signs that the percentage of women or couples deciding not to have children is on the increase in Italy as well, while the model of the only child is spreading, especially in some regions in the North. It can be affirmed with certainty that there has been a drastic reduction in the number of families with many children because in

the past it was less easy to control fertility or because of real reproductive choices. When women reach the limit of their 40th birthday, the proportion of those who have had three or more children has fallen from more than one third in the cohorts born just before the second world war to less than one-fifth in those born in the late 1950s.

The survey on reproductive intentions revealed a noticeable propensity on the part of Italian women for the ideal model of two children. To justify the gap between aspirations and final outcome we must therefore hypothesise a series of objective impediments even if these are simply experienced as such, that introduce themselves into the chain of decisions and events and distance the outcome from the ideal models. There remains, however, a suspicion that given the prevalence of other kinds of aspirations and life models, the ideal reproductive model has in actual fact changed, even if not entirely consciously, while effective behaviour hides behind a series of choices that are considered to have been taken rationally but which necessarily lead to a level of completed fertility which is well below that of a couples' original intentions.

**A**mongst the obstacles that are often mentioned, for women, we find work outside the home. This does not so much reflect an antiquated outlook that denies women's rights and the importance of their contribution to the economy, rather than one that underlines the difficulties that a woman faces in balancing her work commitments with those connected to her role as a mother, and as such accepting a degree of gender inequality that is still common within the family in the division of tasks and responsibilities. The lack of childcare and school services and, above all, the differences between school and working hours constitutes an even more serious impediment to the organisation of the life of a family with children when both parents work. Lastly, women who

are more motivated to work are generally better educated and may reflect cultural and behavioural models in which motherhood comes after other values and aspirations.

If these are the causes behind such reduced reproductive behaviour the job of those who have the responsibility of managing these phenomena should therefore be that of trying to eliminate the most common and practical barriers and to encourage as far as possible the achievement of desired models, at the same time making sure that there is sufficient protection of all the elements of modernisation in society, above all affirming the role of women.

*Giuseppe Gesano*

## The 'marry-as-you-go' process

Young people between the parental home and marriage: Italy, late 1990s (percentages of the relevant sex and age group)

Age group	Men		Women	
	Living in parents' home (a)	Ever married (b)	Living in parents' home (a)	Ever married (b)
15-19	99.0	0.1	98.4	0.9
20-24	91.6	2.9	83.5	12.8
25-29	69.2	21.2	45.7	43.6
30-34	30.8	54.6	16.5	71.9
35-39	13.1	74.9	6.6	83.7

(a) People living in families where they are classified as children: Istat 1998 Multiscope Survey.

(b) Istat estimates of 1st January 2000 population by age and marital status.

## Marriage Instability and Remarriages

With fewer than 46,000 separations and about 26,000 divorces each year (15% and 8% respectively in relation to marriages in the same period) Italy by no means demonstrates the same degree of marriage instability as other western countries. After a period of growth, the respective trends do not show any signs of further increase. The same characteristics of the two phenomena (see table) give a picture of "mature instability", stretching across the time spent in marriage and the age of the subjects. Significant percentages also apply to childless marriages.

The percentage of marriages involving at least one divorced person is only 7% in relation to all marriages, but this figure is increasing and is extremely high (85%) in the case of remarriages.


Some characteristics of separations and divorces: Italy, 1996

	Separations	Divorces (a)	
1/3 before ...	7	11	years since marriage
1/2 before ...	11	15	"
2/3 before ...	16	20	"
Mean age of man	40	43	years
Mean age of woman	37	40	"
Childless marriages	34	44	% out of the total

(a) Following present law, divorce can only be finalised after 3 years of separation.

G. G.

## Women by number of children attained at some birthdays: Italy, 1987 and 1997



# DEMOTREN

	Around 1980	Last available year				Year
	Italy	Italy	North	Centre	South	
Population (thousands)	56,557	57,844	25,834	11,160	20,850	31/12/2000
0-14 years-old population (% total population)	21.4	14.4	12.5	13.0	17.6	1/1/00
15-39 years-old population (% total population)	35.7	35.6	34.6	34.3	37.6	1/1/00
40-64 years-old population (% total population)	29.6	32.0	33.6	33.1	29.3	1/1/00
65-74 years-old population (% total population)	8.5	10.2	10.7	10.9	9.1	1/1/00
75-84 years-old population (% total population)	4.0	5.7	6.1	6.4	4.8	1/1/00
85+ years-old population (% total population)	0.7	2.1	2.4	2.3	1.6	1/1/00
Population growth rate (per 1,000)	0.8	2.8	4.7	5.6	-1.0	2000
Natural increase rate (per 1,000)	1.5	-0.3	-1.4	-1.5	1.7	2000
Births (number in thousands)	623	543	231	97	215	2000
Birth rate (per 1,000 population)	11.0	9.4	8.9	8.6	10.3	2000
Out of wedlock births (per 1,000 births)	44.3	81.9	90.1	83.3	64.2	1996
First-order births (% total births)	46.7	50.9	55.0	54.9	45.6	1996
Second-order births (% total births)	34.4	36.0	35.6	36.3	36.7	1996
Third-order births (% total births)	12.2	9.6	7.7	6.6	13.3	1996
Fourth-order and over births (% total births)	6.7	3.0	2.3	1.1	4.4	1996
Birth from foreign mother (% total birth)	...	3.2	4.5	5.5	1.3	1996
Legal abortions (number in thousands)	215	139	58	30	51	1998
Legal abortion rate (per 1,000 women aged 15-49)	15.3	9.5	9.0	10.2	9.8	1998
Still-birth rate (per 1,000 still + live births)	8.4	4.1	3.8	3.2	4.7	1996
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	13.9	6.1	5.0	6.0	7.1	1996
Secondary education enrolment ratio (% 14-18 years-old population)	72.0	82.8	82.6	92.1	79.6	1998-99
Male post-secondary education enrolment ratio (% 19-23 years-old men)	24.1	10.8	10.0	12.9	10.6	1997-98
Female post-secondary education enrolment ratio (% 19-23 years-old women)	24.1	14.1	12.4	16.8	14.6	1997-98
Male labour-force participation rate (% 15-69 years-old men)	69.5	61.6	62.9	60.5	60.4	2000
Female labour-force participation rate (% 15-69 years-old women)	33.5	35.8	40.8	37.3	28.4	2000
Male unemployment rate (% economically active men)	12.3	8.1	3.0	6.1	16.3	2000
Female unemployment rate (% economically active women)	19.5	14.5	7.1	11.6	30.4	2000
Youth unemployment rate (% economically active population aged 15-24 years)	30.3	31.1	13.6	26.3	55.0	2000
Marriages (number in thousands)	317	275	113	51	111	1999
Nuptiality rate (per 1,000 population)	5.6	4.8	4.4	4.6	5.3	1999
Civil marriages (% total marriages)	12.7	23.0	25.3	25.4	13.9	1999/1997
Men's mean age at first marriage (years)	27.2	30.2	30.7	30.8	29.5	1997
Women's mean age at first marriage (years)	24.0	27.4	27.8	28.2	26.4	1997
Separations (% marriages in the same year)	9.8	23.6	31.9	27.5	12.6	1999
Divorces (% marriages in the same year)	4.1	12.4	17.7	13.7	6.3	1999
Never-married men at age 50-54 years (% 50-54 years-old men)	8.7	9.2	10.7	9.0	7.2	2000
Never-married women at age 45-49 years (% 45-49 years-old women)	9.2	8.8	8.1	8.9	9.4	2000
Single households of man aged 20-49 years (% total households)	1.6	3.7	4.5	4.1	2.3	1998
Single households of woman aged 20-49 years (% total households)	1.1	2.2	2.7	2.7	1.3	1998
Cohabiting couples (% total households)	...	1.5	2.2	1.6	0.6	1998
Couple-without-children households (% total households)	18.2	20.7	22.8	21.7	17.2	1998
Couple-with-children households (% total households)	59.8	46.5	42.6	43.3	53.9	1998
Male one-parent households (% total households)	2.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1998
Female one-parent households (% total households)	6.2	6.7	6.8	6.3	7.0	1998
Average size of households (number of components)	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.9	2000
Mother's mean age at first birth (years)	25.2	28.2	...	...	...	1996
Mother's mean age at childbearing (years)	26.9	30.8	30.6	30.6	29.2	1996
Total fertility rate (children per woman)	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.4	2000/1996
First parity TFR (firstborns per woman)	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	1996
Second parity TFR (second-sons per woman)	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	1996
Third parity and over TFR (third-and-over sons per woman)	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	1996
Contraception rate (% current married users)	76.9	79.0	...	...	...	1995-96
Traditional contraceptive methods (% current married users)	68.4	30.9	...	...	...	1995-96
Net migration (thousands)	44	181	155	79	-54	2000
Sojourn permits (thousands)	332	1341	725	408	209	1/1/00
Sojourn permits (per 1,000 population)	5.9	23.2	28.2	36.8	10.0	1/1/00
Elderly men living alone (% 65+ years-old men)	9.3	11.4	11.6	11.5	10.9	1998
Elderly women living alone (% 65+ years-old women)	27.3	34.4	35.3	35.2	32.5	1998
Institutionalised elderly population (% 65+ years-old population)	13.2	18.0	19.3	19.5	15.5	1/1/00
Male life expectancy at birth (years)	70.9	75.9	75.7	76.3	75.7	1999
Female life expectancy at birth (years)	77.7	82.3	82.5	82.7	81.7	1999
Male life expectancy at age 65 (years)	13.6	16.2	16.2	16.5	16.2	1999
Female life expectancy at age 65 (years)	17.3	20.4	20.6	20.7	19.7	1999

Source: ISTAT and own elaborations of ISTAT data, Italian Fertility and Family surveys (1982, 1995-96)  
 ... Not available

# DS IN ITALY

edited by Massimiliano Crisci and Antonella Guarneri

**P**opulation ageing is the most significant demographic phenomenon in Italy, in particular in the regions of the Centre-North. This can be attributed to the joint effect of two phenomena: increased life expectancy and lower fertility. Life expectancy has reached 82.3 years for women and 75.9 years for men, but the fertility rate is only 1.3 children per woman - amongst the lowest in the world. This produces a negative natural increase (-0.3%) which does not lead to a fall in the population as a whole thanks only to the of migration flows from abroad.



Italy has become one of the main immigration countries at European level as shown by the number of sojourn permits issued - the figure has quadrupled in the last 20 years. It should be noted that the presence of legal immigrants in the North and the Centre (28 and 37 per 1000 residents respectively) is fairly high compared to the figure for the South (10 per 1000). This influences the rate of population increase which is positive only in the Centre-North.

Something new is happening in family structure and, more generally, in the way people consider the family. The contraction in average family size is going on, from 3 to 2.6. This should be seen in connection with various factors such as: the increase in one-person households; the reduction in the fertility rate which, in turn, has been influenced by the big increase (between three and four years) of the mean age of women at the birth of their first child. Couples with children now account for less than half of all households. Even the mean age at marriage has gone up which has a knock-on effect on all the stages of family formation which are further delayed. The development of these phenomena can be correlated with some aspects of the labour market such as the growing level of female participation in the workforce, so that women tend to devote themselves to consolidating their own careers before becoming mothers, and the extremely high rate of youth unemployment (unfortunately Italy is top of the list amongst the OECD countries) which blocks the creation of new families.

Overall, the doubling of civil marriages, separations and the number of singles, as well as the triplication of divorces, leads one to think that the institution of the family is becoming less religious and more fragmented, thus moving closer to the north European standards. On the other hand, even if the number of out-of-wedlock births has doubled in the last 20 years, it is still well below that of all the countries in central and northern Europe.

Furthermore, the use of modern birth control is increasing significantly although Italy is still one of the European countries most attached to traditional methods (31%). The number of abortions and stillbirths is steadily falling.

Globally, it should be observed that the figures relating to the southern regions, compared to the other two main divisions, differ less from national indicators recorded in the 1980s: so, society in the South is still more traditional, especially as regards new ways of considering the family, but differences with the North are decreasing.



## Trends in the Italian Population over the Next 20 Years

A low birth rate and a high survival rate are the two characteristics making Italy the European country where the ageing process is most advanced. At the same time, the regular entry of a considerable number of foreign immigrants in our country is now a consolidated feature, affecting population dynamics on the national level.

What will the future trends be in the Italian population, which opportunities could arise and which problems could occur in our country? Pursuing its longstanding activity, the ISTAT (Central Statistics Institute) has provided a contribution with updated information on demographic forecasts defining the trends in the Italian population in the long term.

The results (available in detail on the website [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it)) describe a country where the total population is stable at around 58 million, at least for the first 20 years of the forecast. However, this stability is only apparent, and the population distribution should change considerably in three main directions.

The first one is the trend in the elderly component of the population, due to rise considerably between 2000 and 2020 from 18% to 23.6% of the total population. We can therefore conclude that the ageing process will continue over the coming years, increasing the demographic burden of elderly people on the working-age population. In other words, dependency rate of the elderly (people aged over 65 per 100 persons aged between 15 and 64) is expected to rise by over 10% in 20 years, increasing from 26.6 to 37.2.

In the same period, the working-age population, which is the demographic basis for the labour supply, is expected to fall by about 2 million. This fall would first of all affect

young people aged between 15 and 29, with a reduction of about 2.6 million, and could involve a reduction of the pressure on the labour market by a segment which now is suffering high unemployment. At the same time, other types of tension may be created due to the significant ageing in the working-age population. This fall would not, in fact, involve just the younger component, but also adults (aged between 30 and 49) with a decrease of 1.9 million, while the only age group to increase would be people aged over 50 (+2.3 million).

Finally, the different geographical population dynamics are expected to slightly shift the 'barycentre' of the Italian population towards North-Central Italy, rising its share from 63.8 to 64.5% on the national total. The main cause lies in the greater attraction of the Northern and Central regions for migration flows, both for internal and for foreign migration.

The results of the forecasts depend on two basic factors: the current population structure, with its inertia, and the hypotheses regarding future scenarios. The latter, shown in the table, have been considerably modified with respect to the previous ISTAT demographic forecasts (1966), especially with regard to mortality and foreign-migration rates. With regard to mortality, expected improvements in survival rates are better marked, in accordance with observations for the past decades. As for foreign migration, the hypotheses in the 1996 edition on

foreign immigration proved to be significantly underestimated in the first years of the forecast. The migration hypotheses for the 2000 edition, revised in the light of the analysis of the historical series of registrations of foreign citizens, show definitely higher figures than the previous ones.

Maria Pia Sorvillo  
ISTAT

Hypotheses for the central scenario of the ISTAT demographic forecasts				
Years	Average number of children per woman	Life expectancy at birth		Migration balance (x 1,000)
		Men	Women	
2000	1.26	76.2	82.6	111
2020	1.41	79.6	86.2	117

## METHODS AND APPLICATIONS

# Wording population

### An experience with textual analysis

**S**tudies on population have to deal with increasingly complex social contexts, and as a consequence, methods of analysis, interpretation and intervention tend to become ever more specialised in order adjust to that complexity. For this reason, at IRP, we have been using textual analysis in an effort to fill out other research methods we use. Over time, this textual approach has become a normal method of analysis, along with the other methods we use.

We originally used textual analysis because we wanted to know how well the press had understood specific scientific information concerning population, at the time IRP published the results of a survey concerning that particular information. The good results we obtained in that first test case have taught us that word analysis of newspaper articles on population questions can help us to understand better the relationship between public opinion and media.

Questions of evaluation, of how to measure the effects of the media on the attitudes and behaviour of their audiences, of individuals and social groups are still open. The relationship between public opinion and the media intuitively seems very simple. It quickly becomes complicated however when we try to conceptualise it or force it into a rigorous and clear relation. The term "media" will be used for the full gamut of communication systems. The most important of these are printed matter (books, newspapers, magazines), and television/radio, followed by new means such as multimedia, computers, the internet.

#### What information

In the period around 12 October 1999 media coverage of "the birth of the world's 6 billionth inhabitant" was high all over the world, especially since this event coincided with presentation of the UNFPA Report, and in Italy with publication of the IRP Survey results on "Knowledge and attitudes of Italians towards world population issues". Since the survey indicated that most people get their information on population

issues from newspapers and television, we decided to apply the same techniques of textual analysis to articles in the Italian press and news broadcasts around 12 October 1999. We wanted to know what information is communicated, how the media treat demographic information, what emphasis they add, how deeply they probe questions, and how balanced the resulting articles and broadcasts are.

We gained information about three important aspects of the media, which we want to emphasize here: the basic structuring of the news by newspapers and newscasts, the differences and similarities in the way information was treated in the various newspaper groups, the characteristics and typical language of each newspaper group. Each of these results was obtained by applying a specific technique of statistical analysis: analysis of correspondence, cluster analysis, and analysis of the specificity of forms and phrases of a text according to the frequency with which they occur. A comparison with contemporary language completed our analysis in order to identify the "key words" in the corpus of articles by comparing it with a list of words taken from a sample of more than 4 million occurrences in contemporary language.

#### The analysis

Factorial analysis helped us to identify the latent linguistic structure used by the press about a specific demographic event. The first thing we noticed is that the way issues were raised by the journalists and communicated to their readers were, on the whole, complete and correct. These included the global international aspect of the main issue and its connection to broad local issues. The journalistic style with its restrained use of emphatic adjectives and emotional expressions helped to guarantee an approach which was neither stereotypical nor superficial. The use too of technical words extended the journalistic vocabulary to include scientific words which are not easily misunderstood or manipulated.

Since we included many different publications, we felt it

was important to analyse the way groups of newspapers, magazines and news broadcasts treated demographic information. We grouped publications by type and cultural or political orientation. We wanted to find out whether there were differences, biases, or interpretations which added up to a different use of information or to a specific type of language. By combining different types of analysis (analysis of characteristic language and classificatory analysis) we were able to observe any differences and also evaluate our groupings. The results of cluster analysis gave us indications consistent with the analyses already considered. They confirm that some groups of newspapers and magazines gave a particular slant to the information. On the other hand they also show that other groups chose to describe the same points and used similar language in doing so.

#### Future steps

It may be obvious to say that the mass media in general, and television in particular, have a huge cultural significance. From the point of view of people who do research into population questions, there are several interesting elements here, including the influence of media on family behaviour, and the use of the media to disseminate values, messages, and knowledge: We will need to modify our approach according to what we want to find out. We surely have to enlarge our theoretical field of vision and the type of analysis we use, in concert with disciplines that study communications and their effects. If instead we want to use media for specific communications questions, we must understand the mechanisms specific to each type of medium, so that we can gather information about the ways information is received and the impact of communications. These mechanisms will include such things as targeting user/consumers, content analysis, and linguistic analysis. Our experience at IRP and the process we followed in presenting the case study on Italy and the 6 billion day survey indeed goes in this direction.

Maura Misiti

## Mortality trends in Italy

### The Mediterranean diet and the North-South disparity in mortality

**T**he North-South contrast of Italy in economic terms is well known. The economic well being of Central and Northern Italy goes along with lower unemployment, higher private consumption and better public services. But for many years mortality indices did not follow the economic well being.

The trend towards a higher life expectancy in Italy continues. In the past, the South presented men with a relative high life expectancy, but women were at a disadvantage. Today men living in Southern Italy lost their advantage, and women reduced their relative disadvantage to 1.3 years. The comparison of today's (1997) adult mortality with the situation in 1980 show that Southern Italian men were in a very favourable position, while Northern Italians were in most age groups in a disadvantage. Now Northern Italian men reached their Southern counterparts, but Southern women continue to have a higher mortality.

Considering the socio-economic disadvantage, the relative advantage of Southern Italians regarding mortality was often attributed to the Mediterranean diet and lifestyle. The Mediterranean diet (associated with pasta, bread, olive oil, fish, fresh fruits and vegetables) is characterised first of all by moderation, especially in Southern Italy, regarding the consumption of red meat and of alcohol. Regarding mortality, the Mediterranean diet and lifestyle is usually associated with lower risks of cardiovascular diseases and lower cancer risks. Data on the per capita consumption of selected foodstuffs confirm significant differences between Northern, Central and Southern Italy. As in other European countries, in the 1960s and 1970s consumption of foodstuff expanded. From the beginning of the 1980s differences in per capita consumption between North and South diminish, the consumption of bread, pasta and meat decreases and the consumption of fish and olive oil increases. Today, Italy follows an overall trend towards meals consumed outside the home and the availability of snacks and soft-drinks.

What is the situation regarding some selected causes of death, which can be linked to the diet?

Let us focus on data for two cancer sites: stomach and colon cancer. Whereas stomach cancer mortality rates declined in Italy, colon cancer death rates increased. Stomach and colon cancer mortality rates are lower in Southern Italy.

Even with decreasing and increasing rates the South keeps its advantage. Unfortunately, for Southern Italy, these two causes of death groups are not determining overall mortality. The Italian situation regarding ischaemic heart diseases and cerebrovascular diseases, the most important causes, improved considerably over the last decades. In the case of ischaemic heart diseases a contra-position of the North with high rates against the Centre and the South with low rates was observed in the 1980s. Today, only Southern elderly men have still considerable lower rates, whereas Southern women never had a favourable position. The geographic differences of mortality due to cerebrovascular diseases follow a clear division with high rates in the South and low rates in the North.

There is much talk about the dysfunction of the health care system in Southern Italy. It is difficult to base a judgement on quantitative indices to measure the performance of the health care system. Most of these indices are not painting such a negative picture of the situation in Southern Italy. But how are people or the patients judging the system? The 1997 statistics of hospital dismission indicate a distinctive South-North migration of the ill: 6.9% of Southern Italians are treated in a hospital of Northern and Central Italy. Whereas only 3.9 and 1.1% of residents of Central and Northern Italy get treatment in other areas. In the case of Sicily this percentage rises to even 15.6%.

Life expectancy at birth			
	1960-62	1978-83	1997
Men			
North	66,7	70,2	75,6
Centre	68,9	72,1	76,4
South	67,7	71,6	75,7
Italy	67,2	71,0	75,8
Women			
North	72,9	77,9	82,4
Centre	73,7	78,7	82,2
South	71,1	77,0	81,1
Italy	72,4	77,7	81,9

Source: Istat and estimates of the authors

In a research project of the authors and directed by Prof. G. Caselli from "La Sapienza" University of Rome, the dynamics of geographic differences of adult and elderly mortality at the provincial level is studied. The provincial level provides for more detail to the study of mortality as can be achieved by an approximate and simplified comparison of Northern, Central and Southern Italy.

The Mediterranean diet and lifestyle seems to loose its role in influencing Italian mortality patterns and disparities. The important ingredients for further improvements in the length and quality of life will probably be economic development, social change and a health conscious and environmentally correct lifestyle.

Loredana Cerbara, Frank Heins, and Rosa Maria Lipsi



# Children and Aspirations in Life: Compromises and Strategies

*Low fertility rate but children at the centre*

**T**he relationship between values in life and having children is an important aspect of the study of reproductive behaviour. Many factors have contributed to some of these values being questioned, especially the basic values of family life. Some of these factors are: the greater involvement of women in the labour market; a wider range of lifestyles due to the greater availability of birth control methods and the legalisation of abortion; changes in family life especially due to separation and divorce; and alternative family lifestyles such as cohabitation, childless marriages or living alone. We would therefore be right to wonder whether the family and children are still important values in our society.

So the relationship between life values and having children is important because of its consequences on the reproductive behaviour of couples. If having children is valued, then procreation is deemed to be 'positive', both in itself and as a means of realising other goals in life such as personal achievement or satisfaction with one's own life. Nevertheless, the decision to have children is perhaps not necessarily taken on a rational basis. People who value having children should logically make this a goal in life and try to have children despite any difficulties or obstacles encountered. Values are therefore important because they affect individual behaviour and determine the major goals to which people aspire. Conversely, many researchers consider procreation and personal achievement to be conflicting or competing factors. In societies like ours, low fertility is often explained by 'competing values', i.e. potential parents consider children to be a factor competing with other values or goals in life. However, is it really true that there is conflict between having children and the materialistic or individualistic goals? Or that, for example, those who want money or a career intend to have fewer children? And what are the main values in life for Italians?

In periodic IRP surveys carried out in the 1990s, we studied this aspect using different perspectives and specific questions. The life values grouped into four major categories: 1) satisfaction in life ('being satisfied and happy with your own life'; 'being respected and approved outside the home'); 2) family and children ('devoting enough care and attention to your chil-

dren'; 'having a happy, harmonious family life'; 'giving your children an appropriate education'; 'not being forgotten in old age' and 'having time for your home while working full time'); 3) materialistic values ('having enough money'; 'trying to achieve success'; 'having a career'; 'having time for yourself and your own interests'; 'having a nice home'; 'equal division of housework'); and 4) religious values ('living according to your faith or religion'). Respondents had to assign the level of importance they considered to be most appropriate for each value (on a 5-point scale going from 'very important' to 'of no importance').

In order to assess whether there is an ideal number of children linked to the achievement of the goals proposed, respondents were asked to state the number of children considered to be most compatible with these goals: no children, one child, two children, or three or more children. There was also an option stating that the number of children was irrelevant to achieving these goals. The surveys, therefore, had a two-step approach in order to identify reproductive strategies and to better understand fertility patterns.

## The main values in life for Italians and their relationship with their children

Our surveys, carried out in 1991 and 1997, showed that there is a pattern of values that respondents considered to be very important and their ranking of goals in life always put the family and children at the top of the list. The desire to devote adequate care and attention to one's children or to provide them with a proper education seems to be the central point in life for Italians and, together with other aspects, contributes to making people feel satisfied with their lives. Thus, children are important and becoming more important.

As regards the number of children which best enables people to achieve their aspirations, Italians seem to have very clear ideas. First of all, with only a few exceptions, one or two children allow people to reach their desired goals but the more materialistic and individualistic values in life (money, career, time for oneself etc.) imply having fewer children. Having a

professional career negatively affects the number of children one could have and, on average, people prefer to have fewer children and leave space for the other goals in life.

Men and women make different assessments of the effect of children on their lives. Generally speaking, men more often want to have two children, while women tend to make carefully considered strategic choices, especially where the materialistic values are concerned. Interesting differences are observed in the area of work. Having a job and a career (0.92 children on average for women and 1.18 for men) and having time for housework and working full time (1.2 children on average for women and 1.42 for men) are easier for women if they have one child or none at all. It is clear that the more children one has the more complicated will be the organisation of daily life. From the two surveys we note that men tend to perceive a child as a commitment - in terms of time, emotional cost and daily presence.

From the economic point of view, fathers on average think it is better to limit the number of children to 1.3 as compared with a higher figure for mothers (1.46). Few differences are found in the area of free time: 1.44 for fathers and 1.48 for mothers.

On the basis of the IRP surveys, we may conclude that in Italy parenthood is still highly valued and having children and being able to raise them, take care of them and educate them are important aspects of life for Italian men and women, even more important than having money or a career. What is more, on the basis of our surveys we can state that the desire for more money or a satisfactory career do not necessarily imply a refusal to have children, though we noted that this negatively affects the number of children people want. It is clear that a strong and definitive shift in ideals towards materialistic values together with a desire for a lower number of children will dampen the reproductive behaviour of Italian population. Only by conducting systematic attitudinal surveys on people's reproductive intentions and linking them to their personal life aspirations, may we have some idea about future fertility trends and rates.

Rossella Palomba

## Availability and Use of Various Technologies, 1999 (%)

	Total	Men	Women	60-64	65-74
TV and 'teletext'	60	67	55	73	53
Video Cassette Recorder	50	58	43	63	42
Pay TV	5	8	3	9	4
Answering-machine	20	24	16	23	18
Washing-machine	31	34	29	36	29
Microwave oven	18	22	15	23	16
Direct debiting of bills	33	38	28	37	30
ATM (withdrawals)	30	40	22	40	25
ATM (purchases)	20	28	14	27	16
Credit card	13	19	8	18	11
Computer	15	20	11	22	11
Internet	6	7	4	9	4

The TV is the most widespread "electrical appliance" among the elderly. If we consider this particular category [we surveyed the TV and 'teletext' combination], i.e. TV enhanced by an advanced information service, it should be stressed that there is an inequality in the availability of this service between aged men and women. Together with the age difference, this inequality is one of the leitmotifs of our analysis and it emerges as a key element in the approach to Information and Communications Technologies. In this case, the distance between women and men and between the more or less aged is particularly evident (12 and 20 percentage points respectively), underlining a state of disadvantage and potential marginalisation of the female and more elderly groups, above all in relation to new technologies. *M.M.*

## I'll leave home if... Children dictate their conditions

The security of a stable job is the indispensable condition for leaving the parental home for the majority of young people. This requirement is particularly pressing for those who haven't as yet found a job and for the younger ones. Nonetheless, this is an attitude which is also shared to a certain extent by those who are working. The need for a reason-


able income is very widespread and also in this case it is an essential requirement, especially for males. The third widely shared and popular condition among young people is marriage. Here the traditional model reappears: passage from one family to another without any intermediate steps. *A.M.*

The necessary conditions for young people to leave home, 1998 %	
Stable job	61
Reasonable income	56
Marriage	46

## The reproductive intentions of Italian women

The research conducted by IRP on reproductive ideals and desires to create the Observatory on Reproductive Intentions, collected data related to short-term reproductive expectations. The third stage of the study on a sample of 1500 married women aged 20-40 years was carried out in January - February 2001. The data show a slight increase in the proportion of women who intend to have a child in the next two years. The intention of whether to have a child in the near future depends on family experience and the demographic characteristics of the women. The female respondents who stated that they did not want children in the next 2-year period were women aged over 35, with 2 children, and a marriage of over 10-years' duration. The characteristics of the women who said they did intend to have a child were the opposite: aged under 29 years, with a short period of marital cohabitation, and they were childless or mothers of 1 child. Besides these demographic variables, we can also observe that the intention of having a child or not also depends on attitudes regarding the woman's past and future economic situation. *A.M.*

Do you intend to have a child in the next two years?  
Married women aged 20-40 years



## A new CNR Institute: the IRPPS

The Italian National Research Council (CNR) is completing a process of revision and rationalisation of its research network through the upgrading of its poles of excellence, mergers, transformations, and suppressions of its bodies.

The aim of the reorganisation of the scientific network is to obtain international-level institutes to be able to participate in common research projects and initiatives with Universities, national and international scientific institutions, and other private and public organisations of particular scientific importance, using innovative organisation models.

In this context, with Provision No. 015770 of 1<sup>st</sup> January 2001, the CNR founded, in Rome, the Institute for Population Research and Social Policies (IRPPS), resulting from the merger of the Institute for Population Research of Rome and the Institute for Research on Social Security Dynamics of Penta di Fisciano (Salerno).

Human and financial resources from other newly restructured research bodies will also flow into the new Institute. The new structure will begin operation from the date its Director is appointed.

### Institutional Aims and Objectives of the Institute for Population Research and Social Policies

The Institute operates in the scientific sectors of population studies, political and social sciences, and information sciences.

The Institute identifies and studies the development and transformation lines of the population and contemporary societies. Its activity aims at meeting a demand coming from the scientific community, political actors, administrative actors, and society.

The new Institute's activity focuses on three main objectives:

*Study of the Relationships between Population Trends and Social and Economic Development Trends*

Analysis of the trends and behaviours of the population within the framework of the reciprocal interactions that take place with the transformations of the social structures, social-policy measures, socio-economic development, and environment.

### *Study of the Social Dynamics and Policies in Welfare Systems*

Analysis of the micro- and macro-transformations of the social systems in the social inclusion-exclusion dynamics for the purpose of defining the welfare policies at the various governance levels.

### *Study of the Changing of Society and the Spread of Knowledge and Information Technologies*

Research on information technologies and communications, training systems and knowledge-organisation systems for the purpose of defining innovative methods; impact analyses and construction of analytical and forecasting instruments to support policy choices.



IRPPS address: via Nizza, 128 - 00198 Roma

## NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS

The IUSSP (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population) **Working Group on Low fertility** organized in Tokyo on last March 21-23 a Seminar titled "International Perspectives on Low Fertility: Trends, Theories and Policies". Rossella Palomba of IRP presented a report on "Postponement of Family formation in Italy, within the Southern European context".

From April 2001 the CNR researcher **Fabio Palazzo** began by working in IRP. He is interested in Health and Environmental Policy. He came from the Biomedical Technologies Institute of CNR, Department of the Medical Informatics and Sanitary Economics, in which he was responsible of the research on Economic Evaluation of Health Technologies.

Starting May, 2001 Rossella Palomba from IRP has been appointed Italian representative in the **Human Potential Socio-economic research Programme at European Commission**.

**The European Population Conference organized by EAPS** (European Association for Population Studies) was held in Helsinki on June 7-9, 2001. The IRP researchers contributed the following papers: "Fertility Expectation and Subsequent Behaviour: First Result" by Adele Menniti (Theme A); "Dynamics of Geographical Differences in adult mortality and the Impact of external variables. Italy 1971-1993" by Graziella Caselli, Loredana Cerbara, Frank Heins and Rosa Maria Lipsi (Theme C); "Older People and the New Technologies in Italy; a Case Study" by Maura Misiti (Theme F). Giuseppe Gesano, IRP Director, was the Chairperson of the Session E6 "Integration and behaviours of immigrants".

On Thursday 21 June 2001 AIDOS (Associazione Italiana Donne per lo Sviluppo - Italian Women Association for the Development) presented to the press and the public opinion: **"Population Issues in The Developing World: an Update on the Italian Public's Perceptions**. Research Study Conducted for UNFPA".

The report concerns the Italian findings in a thirteen-country study commissioned by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and conducted by MORI (Market & Opinion Research International). The main results of the research has been presented by Maura Misiti from IRP and Barbara Martinelli from Pragma. Daniela Colombo, AIDOS President, introduced the meeting.

**The IUSSP** will hold its XXIV General Population Conference in Salvador de Bahia, Brazil, on August 18-24, 2001.

The IRP researchers contributed the following papers: S31 "The 6 billion day: An Italian survey on public opinion and mass media" by Maura Misiti; P12 "Family and social networks in Italy" by Adele Menniti e Rossella Palomba; P42 "Dynamics of urbanisation in Italy" by Corrado Bonifazi and Frank Heins.

Furthermore the IRP will be present at the Conference with an exhibition (stand n. 34) to display its products: CD Rom, videotapes, newsletters, posters and papers.

On 10 July, in Addis Ababa was held the **Dissemination Seminar Ethio-Italian-multi-bilateral Collaboration Research Work**. It concludes a two-year-collaboration between the Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority (CSA) and IRP, financed by the Italian Cooperation under the auspices of UNFPA. Objective of the collaboration was to develop in-depth studies of seven topics on the basis of the 1994 Population and Housing Census in Ethiopia. Besides the experience of its own researchers (Giuseppe Gesano and Frank Heins), IRP involved Italian scholars from other research bodies.

## FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

*Public awareness and the Role of media: an Italian Survey on the 6 billion day* edited by **Maura Misiti**, Quaderni di Demotrends 2-Agosto 2001



## AND WHAT'S MORE...

Regarding the demographic situation in Italy see:  
- *People, Policy and Perspectives*, **Moors H.** and **Palomba R.** (eds.), Collana Monografie dell'IRP n. 3, 1991.

- *Population, Family and Welfare*, **Moors H.** and **Palomba R.** (eds.), Clarendon Press Oxford voll. 2, 1995 and 1998

- *Facts and Trends in Population*, **Giuseppe Gesano** (ed.), IRP, 1999

- *Push and pull factors of international migration. Country report: Italy*, **Birindelli A.M., Blangiardo G., Bonifazi C.**

## CONTINUE FROM 1<sup>st</sup> PAGE

wider than twenty years ago. Yet net migration from the South remains low: just 3 per thousand in 1999, or 70,000 person of all ages, compared with a mass of 1.6 million unemployed. Greater internal mobility could improve the geographical allocation of human resources and cut the need for immigration. The same goes for intra-European mobility, which is also very low. Just one EU citizen in 60 resides outside his or her native country, a minuscule figure considering that in Italy, for instance, one person in 9 lives outside the part of the country where he or she was born. On the other hand, mobility between adjacent regions in different countries is a full order of magnitude less than that between regions within a country. Notwithstanding the principles affirmed in treaties, the countries of the European Union do not yet constitute a single labour market.

Better institutional, infrastructural and legal conditions in support of mobility, including adequate salary incentives, can improve the allocation of our admittedly scarce national and European human resources and hence moderate the need for immigrants. The same goes for actions that could attenuate the mechanism of labour market segmentation and native workers' refusal of some jobs owing to their nature of pay.

Our question, then – "Should the gaps be filled?" – demands an articulated response. Intensifying work can certainly fill part of the vacuum for the next two decades; if the idea is to avoid a loss of economic "weight" by comparison with other countries, little reliance can be placed on productivity gains; some marginal moderation of the demand for immigrant labour can come from better mobility. Nevertheless, the fall in the working-age population will be so significant over the next 20 to 30 years (from then on it will depend on future birth rates) that substantial immigration will be inevitable. The group between 20 and 40 years old – the most flexible, mobile, innovative part of the population – will shrink by 6 million (35 per cent) in the next 20 years. It is hard not to imagine that a portion, and a large portion, of this loss will be made good by immigrants.

M. L. B.

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