Design (2)
Demographic Aging, Migration and New Family Models

Interview with Angela Paparusso, demographer in the Population and Migration research group. July 11, 2023 (World Population Day)

Speaking of population, there are several “records” that have been set in the past year at the global level…

One was certainly the surpassing of 8 billion inhabitants of the Earth at the end of 2022, which occurred with global population growth below 1%, while the surpassing of 9 billion inhabitants is expected by 2050.

This means we have a world split in half, where there are countries growing at a decidedly sustained pace—in this context, an important event was India’s numerical overtaking of China—compared to another part of the world, mainly Western countries, which instead registers negative growth.

This is what is happening, for example, in Italy…

This is negative growth determined by demographic aging, which is linked on one hand to the increase in life expectancy for men and women and, on the other, to the reduction in fertility. In Italy, the total fertility rate, for example, is 1.3 children per woman, in a European context where fertility does not exceed 2.1 children per woman, the so-called “replacement threshold” whereby a couple leaves itself as a legacy, bringing into the world slightly more than two children per couple.

What are the consequences of demographic aging?

Demographic aging in itself is not a problem, because people live longer and we generally try to live better. However, this phenomenon has consequences that mainly concern the issue of economic sustainability: the working-age population is reduced and the segment of the population that will contribute to the pensions of tomorrow’s elderly is thinning.

Another aspect is linked to territory. There are areas of the country undergoing a depopulation process, in Sardinia or the inland areas of Southern Italy, where fertility is habitually lower than in Northern Italy.

There is often discussion of the relationship between demographic aging, new family models and migration…

Family models have changed compared to the past; migration, as far as we are concerned, is a factor that cannot reverse this trend but can certainly, and has already in the past, mitigate demographic aging. It does so with populations that have a younger demographic structure and that, at least initially, have a higher number of children, although the trend is then to adapt to the demographic structures in which people live.

Why can migration only mitigate but not reverse the dynamics of demographic aging?

Take the case of Italy: a very significant number of migrants would be needed, which is not realistic and perhaps not very sustainable from various points of view. But also because emigrated populations adapt. Thinking again of Italy, which, contrary to what is believed, is the destination of migration mainly from Eastern Europe of women who come to Italy at the end of their childbearing age, while it is often only a transit country for populations from countries experiencing a demographic explosion that creates a window of opportunity for them, causing these people to seek opportunities, resources, education and work outside national borders. This helps us understand the structural nature of the migratory phenomenon, characterized by demographic issues both downstream and upstream.

What can policy do?

It would be desirable for policy to be able to frame both migration and fertility in a long-term perspective.

Migration is not something we suffer but is a constitutive feature of our reality, which can help us address a crisis situation we are experiencing also at the population level. This would mean opening legal migration pathways so that people do not try to slip through the cracks of systems that close access doors. Similarly, greater attention should be paid to an often underestimated issue, which is emigration, whereby many young people, but not only, go abroad for reasons not only of study but also work.

The same applies to the fertility problem. Policy should consider that to reverse certain trends, providing economic incentives is not enough; long-term policies must be implemented with more widespread distribution of services that help couples, families, to have children and especially to balance private and working life.

For example?

Our studies have shown how simply making nurseries and childcare services available more widely can actually lead to a small increase in fertility. As would a more equitable division of roles within the family. An issue that is not a matter for the individual but must be conveyed more broadly at the level of public debate.

Edited by Monia Torre

See also:
Social Informatics and Population – Interview with Patrizia Grifoni
Population and Economy – Interview with Daniele Archibugi